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Blockholder Characteristics and Earnings Quality
Aslihan Gizem Korkmaz
Qingzhong Ma
Haigang Zhou
This study focuses on the impact of blockholder characteristics on earnings quality. Most of the studies in 
literature make the implicit assumption that blockholders are a homogeneous group. This study is one of 
few studies that acknowledges the heterogeneity of blockholders and attempts to understand the 
unexplained proportion of blockholder heterogeneity. Earnings quality is calculated using the modified 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model with fixed effects (FDD model) by Lee and Masulis (2009), and it is 
regressed on various blockholder characteristics. The results show that earnings quality is lower for 
firms with market-driven and multilateral blockholders.
INTRODUCTION
When investors evaluate the financial health of a firm, reported earnings are the center of attention. 
Nevertheless, managers tend to misstate earnings. When managers are under pressure to meet market 
expectations, the likelihood of them engaging in earnings management activities increases. The use of 
accrual-basis accounting lays the groundwork for distortion as estimation of accruals is a subjective 
practice.
Distortion of financial statements leads to poor quality accounting information, which makes it 
difficult for investors to evaluate a firm’s true financial health, allows room for private benefits, and 
increases information asymmetry between managers and investors (Jo & Kim, 2007).
There are various mechanisms to prevent managers from engaging in earnings management, however. 
One is the existence of large shareholders, or blockholders, which is the main focus of this study. The 
existence of blockholders has been associated with better monitoring of management (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986; Admati, Pfleiderer, & Zechner, 1994; Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998), less severe agency problems 
between managers and shareholders (Gillan & Starks, 2003), and a lower likelihood of earnings 
management (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002; Cheng & Reitanga, 2009).
Most studies in the literature make the implicit assumption that blockholders are a homogeneous 
group and analyze the impact of their existence alone (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002). However, 
blockholders are a heterogeneous group, and only a few studies acknowledge their heterogeneity 
(Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009 and Dou, Hope, Thomas, & Zou, 2016). Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2009) asserts that blockholders vary in their beliefs, skills, and preferences. Dou et al. (2016) posit that a 
significant part of blockholder heterogeneity is still unexplained.
This study attempts to understand the unexplained proportion of blockholder heterogeneity and 
analyzes the impact of blockholders on earnings quality, specifically accrual quality. In this study, we use 
an inverse measure of earnings quality calculated by using the FDD model that Lee and Masulis (2009) 
propose. FDD model is the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model of McNichols (2002) with fixed 
effects.
We then regress this inverse measure of earnings quality on blockholder characteristics. Controlling 
for firm characteristics and auditor choice, we examine the impact of various types of blockholders on 
earnings quality. Our results show that earnings quality is lower for firms with market-driven and 
multilateral blockholders.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Earnings Quality
Among the many components of financial statements, reported earnings have always been the center 
of attention. However, reported earnings are subject to deliberate or inadvertent misstatement. Typically, 
managers use accrual-basis accounting to communicate a firm’s true earnings to investors. This method 
values relevancy of information over reliability and records revenues and expenses when they accrue, or 
in the absence of a cash transaction. Hence, the term accrual refers to any adjustment on revenue and 
expense accounts.
An example of accruals is a sale made on credit. When a firm sells merchandise on credit, the revenue 
is recorded at the time of sale, not when the payment is actually received. The sale made on credit is 
recorded as accounts receivable. When the firm decides that a receivable becomes uncollectible, the 
amount is written off as bad debt on the income statement. Jackson and Liu (2010) found that firms 
manage bad debt expenses to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Another way to manage earnings is through depreciation charges on property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE). SEC litigation release no. 17435 dated March 26, 2002, which concerns the complaint charging 
the founder and five former top officers of Waste Management, Inc., includes the following example. 
“Among other things, defendants avoided depreciation expenses on their garbage trucks by both assigning 
unsupported and inflated salvage values and extending their useful lives.”1
Accruals can be divided into two categories: Discretionary (abnormal) accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals, which are obligatory and depend on a firm’s business model, operating environment, and 
accounting policies (Christensen, Frimor, & Sabac, 2013). There is no room for managerial discretion in 
non-discretionary accruals. Conversely, discretionary accruals are non-obligatory, and managers use their 
own discretion when recording them.
Often, under pressure to meet or beat the expectations of analysts and investors, managers have a 
tendency to manage earnings. Earnings management is defined as the act of manipulating accruals to 
paint an overly positive picture of a firm’s business activities and financial state. In his often-cited speech 
“The Numbers Game,” Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, talks 
about the anecdotal example of a firm that failed to meet its earning estimates by one penny and lost more 
than six percent of its stock value in one day.2
Distortion of accruals creates poor quality accounting information that makes it difficult for investors 
to evaluate a firm’s true financial health, allows room for private benefits, and increases information 
asymmetry between managers and investors (Jo & Kim, 2007).
Many approaches have been used in literature to proxy for earnings quality. Typically, they involve 
the use of a regression method, and the variables change from one approach to another. The main problem 
with different approaches is estimation errors. Some of the commonly used approaches in recent literature 
are explained here.
The Jones (1991) model was one of the first to be used widely in literature. She uses a regression 
model where the dependent variable is total accruals in current year scaled by assets in the past year.
Then, the estimates of firm-specific parameters that are obtained from this model during the estimation 
period are used in the model for nondiscretionary accruals. The prediction error obtained from this model 
shows the level of discretionary accruals. The higher the level of discretionary accruals, the lower the 
accrual quality.
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) investigates alternative models that measure accrual quality to 
detect earnings management. As a result of their analyses, they propose a modified version of the Jones 
(1991) model and assert that their model is better able to detect earnings management.
A divergence from this method to estimate accrual quality comes with Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
The authors analyze the quality of accruals and earnings, paying special attention to estimation errors. 
Asserting that the quality of accruals and earnings is negatively related to the magnitude of estimation 
errors, they introduce a new approach to assess earnings quality. Their method uses the standard deviation 
of the firm-specific residuals from the regression of their accrual measure, which is the change in working 
capital, on past, current, and future cash flow from operations to proxy for accruals quality. All of the 
variables are scaled by total assets. The residuals from this regression show the accruals that are not 
related to cash flow from operations, and a higher standard deviation is a signal of lower accrual quality.
McNichols (2002) establishes a bridge between Jones (1991) model and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. The study analyzes the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (DD model) and provides empirical 
evidence of measurement error in their application. She adapts the DD model to assess the specification 
of the Jones (1991) model and finds that estimates from this new model, which will be referred to as the 
MDD model hereafter, are more significantly related with cash flows.
Later, Lee and Masulis (2009) analyze the DD model and the MDD model and propose a new model. 
They extend the MDD model to include firm fixed effects to capture unobserved firm characteristics, such 
as accounting policies and cash flow characteristics. The authors assert that their model, which will be 
referred to as the FDD model hereafter, mitigates problems caused by possibly omitted variables in the 
MDD model and directly adjusts for heteroskedasticity.
Blockholders
Blockholders are defined as large shareholders that typically own at least 5 percent of a firm’s 
outstanding shares (Klein, 2002; Krishnan & Lee, 2009; Dou et al., 2016). They can be institutions, such 
as insurance companies, pension funds, banks, or investment companies, or they can be individuals, such 
as outside investors or firm managers.
The existence of blockholders in firms is often perceived as a sign of strong corporate governance 
regardless of whether the shareholder is an insider or an outsider. Outsider blockholders are seen as an 
effective monitoring mechanism because they are able to influence management’s activities by their 
shareholdings, which grant them voting rights (Klein, 2002; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Demiralp, D’Mello, 
Schlingemann, & Subramaniam, 2011), and by trading their shares (Gillan & Starks, 2003). The existence 
of large outside investors is associated with higher abnormal returns following equity issues 
(Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, & Parrino, 2006), decreased likelihood of earnings management 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Chung et al., 2002; Cheng & Reitanga, 2009), stricter control over executive 
compensation (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), and increased 
management turnover (Kang & Shivdasani, 1995).
On the other hand, insider blockholders, such as managers, are seen as better agents because their 
stock ownership aligns their interests with those of outside shareholders. Managerial ownership is 
associated with decreased likelihood of earnings management (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995).
The Impact of Blockholders on Earnings Quality
Since there are certain costs associated with monitoring managers’ actions, only large shareholders 
have sufficient incentive to monitor managers (Gillan & Starks, 2003). Typically, the existence of large 
shareholders, or blockholders, mitigates the agency problem between managers and shareholders (Gillan 
& Starks, 2003) by monitoring the managers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994; Huddart, 
1993; Maug, 1998) and decreases the likelihood of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996; Chung et 
al., 2002; Cheng & Reitanga, 2009).
Many studies that analyze the impact of blockholders consider them to be a homogeneous group 
(Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002). However, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) assert that blockholders 
are a heterogeneous group, and their results suggest that blockholders vary in their beliefs, skills, and 
preferences.
The studies that acknowledge the heterogeneity among blockholders analyze the impact of various 
blockholder characteristics by classifiying them into categories based on their shareholding duration 
(Demiralp et al., 2011; Dou et al., 2016), affiliation status (Borokhovich et al., 2006), active status and 
shareholding size (Cheng & Reitanga, 2009; Dou et al., 2016), response to pressure (David et al., 1998), 
insider status (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Dou et al., 2016), institution type (Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2009), and geographic proximity to firm (Dou et al., 2016).
To date, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) and Dou et al. (2016) are the only studies in literature that 
explore the impact of blockholders on corporate policies and firm accounting practices on a large scale. 
However, a significant proportion of blockholder heterogeneity still remains unexplained, so there is need 
for additional research to better understand the specific mechanisms through which blockholders affect 
financial reporting (Dou et al., 2016).
This study adds to the literature on blockholder heterogeneity by focusing on various blockholder 
attributes, such as incentive, insider/outsider status, shareholding size, geographic proximity, and 
shareholding duration.
DATA AND VARIABLES
Data
Our initial sample consists of firms listed in the RiskMetrics database because it contains information 
regarding shares held by board members and helps us identify the independence of blockholders. Then, to 
obtain firm characteristics, we merge this dataset with the Compustat database.
Holderness (2009) discusses the necessity of hand-collecting data from proxy statements and the 
challenges associated with this process when working with block ownership data. Thus, we collect data 
about block ownership from proxy statements (DEF 14A) available online on the SEC’s EDGAR 
database for each firm and follow Holderness’s approach to overcome the challenges that arise in data 
collection.
Our data structure is annual and the firm-year observations span the years 2009, 2010, and 2011.3 
Using hand-collected data helps to make the data collection manageable. Following previous literature, 
we exclude firms with missing data, financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4910­
4940), firms not listed on NYSE, and firms with dual-class shares (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
There are 1,069 observations in our final dataset. The 1,069 firm-year observations in our sample have 
3,095 blockholders. There are 146 insiders and 2,949 outsiders.
Overall, 95% of the firms in our sample have blockholders that own at least 5% of the firm’s stock. 
This is consistent with Holderness (2009), who asserts that 96% of the firms in his sample of 375 firms 
have blockholders that own at least 5% of the firm’s stock.
Industry differences play an important role on firms’ accrual policies. Rakestraw, Kumar and Maher 
(2015) hypothesize that the likelihood that a firm will manage its earnings is related to the industry in 
which it operates because certain industry factors, such as the existence and size of various assets, 
liabilities, earnings, and expenses, may increase or decrease the chances of managing earnings. Francis 
and Gunn (2015) mention that some industries have greater accounting complexity, and they use the 
existence of additional industry-specific accounting guidelines to proxy for this complexity. More 
specifically, they use the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Audit and Accounting 
Practice Guides and Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Topic 900: Industry Series and assert that 
18 of 48 Fama-French industries can be classified as complex. The authors show that accruals are 
fundamentally different, and earnings are noisier in these industries. Typically, high-accrual firms have 
more potential to engage in earnings management (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999).
Francis and Gunn (2015) use the example of computer and software industry to demonstrate industry­
specific complexity. This industry has been an area of debate due to its unique attributes. In his article 
published in the Wall Street Journal in 2002, Ken Brown mentions that firms in the software industry 
usually get into long-term contracts to supply and service their products. The author explains that some 
firms follow a conservative approach and book the revenue from a multi-year contract in equal parts for 
each year, while others follow an aggressive approach and book the bulk of the revenue in the first or 
second year. This, in turn, brings judgment in revenue recognition of these companies because the amount 
of services provided in the later years is unclear.4
Following literature, we use Fama-French’s 48 industry classifications to analyze our sample. The 
number of observations in the sample of firms with blockholders is highest in Business Services (BusSv), 
Retail (Rtail), and Machinery (Mach) industries. Francis and Gunn (2015) classify Business Services 
under complex industries, and they classify Retail and Machinery under non-complex industries. In our 
regression analyses, we perform clustering at industry level to obtain robust standard errors that allow for 
heteroskedasticity and industry fixed effects (Ferreira & Laux, 2016).
On the other hand, the number of observations in the sample of firms without blockholders is highest 
in the Electrical Equipment (ElcEq) industry, which Francis and Gunn (2015) classify under non-complex 
industries.
Variables
Our dependent variable is a reverse measure of accrual quality measured by using the FDD model of 
Lee and Masulis (2009), which is explained in the literature review. The independent variables that are 
classified as blockholder characteristics and control variables are explained below.
Blockholder Characteristics
Incentive: Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) find blockholder effects to be more concentrated for 
investor categories, such as activists, pension funds, corporations, individuals, private equity firms, and 
mutual funds. Furthermore, Camara (2005) asserts that institutional investors have different incentives 
and classifies them into four categories. The first three categories are based on incentive-creating forces, 
such as market, political, and social forces, and the last category includes multilateral investors. We 
follow the classification in Camara (2005) and group blockholders into four different classes using four 
binary dummy variables that take the value 1 for firms that belong to that category. Then, we count the 
number of investors who belong to each investor class for each firm-year observation.
Camara (2005) asserts that institutional investors have concerns other than increasing shareholder 
wealth. Thus, at times they sacrifice shareholder wealth to obtain those benefits. Even when the institution 
is focused on maximizing shareholder wealth, its agents might have different motives that will reduce 
shareholder wealth. Accordingly, we expect to see different impacts on accrual quality for each investor 
class. The investor classes and their motives as described in Camara (2005) are provided below.
a) Market-Driven Blockholders: This class includes hedge funds, mutual funds, and venture capitalists. 
Financial gain motivates these investors. However, there are times when their focus is not to maximize 
the value of individual portfolio firms, or their managers may have other motives. Thus, we do not have a 
prediction for the sign of this variable.
b) Politically Driven Blockholders: This class includes state, public pension funds, and shareholders with 
a cause. These investors are typically insulated from market forces, and their need for the consent of 
others motivates them. Nonetheless, the degree to which their motives recede from maximizing 
shareholder wealth changes. Thus, we do not have a prediction for the sign of this variable.
c) Socially Driven Blockholders: This class includes gentlemen of affairs (investors who obtained 
substantial ownership by virtue of their position in society), founding families and plutocrats, wealthy 
managers, and technocrats. These investors are typically insulated from market and political forces, and 
internal psychological forces, including education, religion, and moral and cultural norms, motivate them.
Most of these investors are still somewhat sensitive to market and political forces. Thus, we expect to see 
a negative relationship between their existence and our reverse measure of accrual quality.
d) Multilateral Blockholders: This class includes private pension funds, bank trust departments, and 
insurers. These investors have numerous financial relationships with the firm. When the payoffs related to 
the other relationships differ from the one associated with equity ownership, they will diverge from 
maximizing shareholder value. Thus, we expect to see a positive relationship between their existence and 
our reverse measure of accrual quality.
Independence: Borokhovich et al., (2006), Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2007), and Dou et al., (2016) 
classify blockholders based on their independence status. In this study, we use a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if more than half of the blockholders are insiders.
The existence of outsider blockholders is seen as a sign of good corporate governance. On the other 
hand, while managerial stock ownership aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders, 
beyond a certain level, it may be a sign of managerial entrenchment. If that is the case, it would lead to 
worse accrual quality. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between our dummy variable and our 
reverse measure of accrual quality.
Shareholding Size: Cheng and Reitenga (2009), and Dou et al. (2016) use the size of blockholders’ 
holdings of a firm’s shares because blockholders with a larger holding size have greater influence on a 
firm’s corporate policies. Thus, we use the average percentage of shares that blockholders hold for each 
firm-year observation. We expect to observe a negative relationship between these variables and our 
reverse measure of accruals quality.
Geographic Proximity: People typically know more about the companies around their town. Dou et 
al. (2016) uses a geographic proximity variable, and if the blockholders live within a 100-km radius of the 
firm, they are considered local blockholders. Following their method, we identify blockholders who are 
local and expect to observe a negative relationship between the number of local blockholders and our 
reverse measure of accrual quality.
Shareholding Duration: Demiralp et al. (2011) and Dou et al. (2016) assert that the shareholding 
duration of blockholders is also an important control variable. Demiralp et al. (2011) explains that 
institutions that make long-term investments in firms are more active monitors and focus on the long-term 
performance of the firm. Following Dou et al. (2016), we use a three-year threshold for a blockholder to 
be classified as a long-term investor. We use a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for long­
term investors and 0 otherwise. We expect to find a negative relationship between the number of long­
term investors and our reverse measure of accrual quality.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for blockholder characteristics. On average, a firm has three 
blockholders, and an average blockholder holds 8.22% of the shares. The highest number of long-term 
and local blockholders in a firm is four, and there are firms with no long-term or local blockholders. The 
number of outsider blockholders is higher than the number of insider blockholders. Market-driven 
blockholders are the most prevalent type of investors in our sample.
TABLE 1
BLOCKHOLDER CHARACTERISTICS
This table presents descriptive statistics for blockholder characteristics.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Average percentage of shares that blockholders hold 8.22 7.53 3.48 5 48.93
Number of blockholders 3.04 3 1.57 1 10
Number of long-term blockholders 0.89 1 0.96 0 4
Number of local blockholders 0.38 0 0.70 0 4
Number of inside blockholders 0.14 0 0.40 0 3
Number of outside blockholders 2.90 3 1.56 0 10
Number of market-driven blockholders 2.50 2 1.48 0 9
Number of politically driven blockholders 0.01 0 0.10 0 1
Number of socially driven blockholders 0.21 0 0.51 0 3
Number of multilateral blockholders 0.33 0 0.57 0 4
Control Variables
Size: Firm size is a frequently used control variable in earnings management studies (Dechow & 
Dichev, 2002; Klein, 2002; Chung et al., 2002; Mitra & Cready, 2005; Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006; 
Cheng & Reitanga, 2009; Lee & Masulis, 2009; Guthrie & Sokolowsky, 2010; Dou et al., 2016).
Lee and Masulis (2009) assert that large companies are more likely to be followed by analysts, media, 
and investors. Thus, the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders is likely to be less 
than smaller companies. Furthermore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) find a positive relationship between 
firm size and accrual quality. Following previous literature, we use natural logarithm of total assets to 
proxy for firm size, and we expect to observe a negative relationship between our reverse measure of 
accrual quality and firm size.
ROA: Guthrie and Sokolowsky (2010) and Dou et al. (2016) find return on assets (ROA) to be a 
significant control variable because it proxies for firm operating performance and that is related to accrual 
by definition. ROA equals net income divided by total assets. Consistent with prior literature, we expect 
to observe a negative relationship between ROA and our reverse measure of accrual quality.
Growth: Core (2001) asserts that firms with high growth potential have higher information 
asymmetry. Bradbury et al. (2006) posits that high-growth firms will adopt mechanisms to mitigate the 
agency problem. Klein (2002), Gabrielsen, Gramlich and Plenborg (2002), Bradbury et al. (2006), and 
Zhong, Gribbin and Zheng (2007) use the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity as a 
proxy for growth variable. Following them, we use the same ratio to proxy for growth and expect to 
observe a negative relationship between growth and our reverse measure of accrual quality.
Leverage: Leverage is another control variable that is commonly used in research that focuses on 
earnings management (Chung et al., 2002; Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, & Jiambalvo, 2002; Cheng & 
Reitanga, 2009; Guthrie & Sokolowsky, 2010; Dou et al., 2016).
The more the firms are leveraged, the greater the managers’ incentives to undertake riskier projects 
(Lee & Masulis, 2009) and to make income-increasing discretionary accruals (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994) will be.
Following the literature, we calculate leverage by dividing total debt by book value of total assets and 
expect to observe a positive relationship between leverage and our reverse measure of accrual quality.
Auditor Choice: Auditor choice is another important factor to control for. Dechow et al. (1996) 
investigate the causes and consequences of earnings manipulation and assert that independence and 
quality of the outside auditor will impact the likelihood that earnings manipulation is detected. Thus, we 
use a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm works with one of the big four auditors: 
Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu, and KPMG, and 0 otherwise. 
We expect that working with a big four auditor will mitigate the likelihood of earnings management.
RESEARCH METHODS
Univariate Analysis
As the first step, we calculate earnings quality for each firm-year observation using the FDD model. 
Then we investigate whether the existence of blockholders has a significant impact on earnings quality. 
Following Dechow et al. (1996), we perform a t-test for the difference in means and a Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test for the difference in medians.
Table 2 presents mean and median values for different incentive groups. Panel A compares mean and 
median values for firms with market-driven blockholders and firms with no market-driven blockholders. 
Panel B compares mean and median values for firms with politically driven blockholders and firms with 
no politically driven blockholders. Panel C compares mean and median values for firms with socially 
driven blockholders and firms with no socially driven blockholders. Panel D compares mean and median 
values for firms with multilateral blockholders and firms with no multilateral blockholders.
Overall, firms with market-driven blockholders and multilateral blockholders seem to have 
significantly higher values, which translates to lower accrual quality and a higher likelihood of earnings 
management activities.
TABLE 2
EARNINGS QUALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF BLOCKHOLDERS (FDD MODEL)
This table presents earnings quality for different incentive groups. Following Ferreira and Laux (2016), 
we use an inverse measure of earnings quality. We perform e t-test for the difference in means and a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in medians. Panel A compares mean and median values for 
firms with market-driven blockholders (BH) and firms with no market-driven blockholders. Panel B 
compares mean and median values for firms with politically driven blockholders and firms with no 
politically driven blockholders. Panel C compares mean and median values for firms with socially driven 
blockholders and firms with no socially driven blockholders. Panel D compares mean and median values 
for firms with multilateral blockholders and firms with no multilateral blockholders. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Incentive Classification Mean t Median z
Panel A. Market-driven blockholders
No market-driven BH 0.0054 -1.42 0.0020 -1.81*
Market-driven BH 0.0087 0.0034
Difference -0.0033 -0.0014
Panel B. Politically driven blockholders
No politically driven BH 0.0086 0.70 0.0033 0.3
Politically driven BH 0.0053 0.0034
Difference 0.0033 -0.0001
Panel C. Socially driven blockholders
No socially driven BH 0.0088 1.10 0.0032 0.52
Socially driven BH 0.0074 0.0038
Difference 0.0014 -0.0006
Panel D. Multilateral blockholders
No multilateral BH 0.0079 -2.19** 0.0033 1.01
Multilateral BH 0.0102 0.0034
Difference -0.0023 -0.0001
Multivariate Analysis
To analyze the relationship between blockholder heterogeneity and financial reporting quality, we use 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method and regress FDD on blockholder characteristics and 
firm characteristics variables. The specifications we use are variants of the base model provided below.
FDD = f(Majority Inside Dummy, Number of Local Blockholders,
Number of Long-Term Blockholders, Number of Market-Driven
Blockholders, Number of Politically Driven Blockholders,
Number of Socially Driven Blockholders, Number of Multilateral
Blockholders, Average Percentage of Shares Held by Blockholders,
ln(Size), ROA, Growth, Leverage, Big 4 Auditor Dummy) (1)
We perform clustering at industry level to obtain robust standard errors that allow for 
heteroskedasticity and industry-fixed effects (Ferreira & Laux, 2016).
Table 3 presents the results for the regression analyses. Dependent variable is the reverse measure of 
accrual quality calculated using the FDD model. Models 1 to 5 are different specifications of the baseline 
regression model. Model 1 includes all variables in the baseline model. Model 2 specifically tests the 
impact of market-driven blockholders on FDD. Model 3 specifically tests the impact of politically driven 
blockholders on FDD. Model 4 specifically tests the impact of socially driven blockholders on FDD. 
Model 5 specifically tests the impact of multilateral blockholders on FDD.
Looking at the table, blockholders driven by market forces and multilateral blockholders seem to have 
a significant negative impact on accrual quality, meaning the firm is more likely to engage in earnings 
management. In model 4, socially driven blockholders seem to have a significant impact on accrual 
quality, and the negative sign of this relationship is consistent with our expectations.
TABLE 3 
REGRESSION ANALYSES
This table presents the results of the regression analyses. Dependent variable is the reverse measure of accrual quality calculated using the FDD 
model following Ferreira and Laux (2016). We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. We also use robust standard errors 
corrected for clustering at industry level to allow for heteroskedasticity and industry-fixed effects. Models 1-5 are different specifications of the 
baseline regression model. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Parameter
Exp. 
Sign Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t
Intercept 0.0300 5.57*** 0.0305 5.69*** 0.0336 6.39*** 0.0337 6.52*** 0.0332 6.29***
Majority inside + 0.0029 1.00 0.0020 0.71 0.0014 0.49 0.0025 0.88 0.0018 0.63
No. of local BH - 0.0002 0.22 0.0000 -0.03 -0.0001 -0.15 0.0006 0.70 -0.0002 -0.27
No. of long-term
BH - -0.0007 -1.33 -0.0007 -1.44 -0.0004 -0.98 -0.0002 -0.48 -0.0006 -1.28
No. of market- 
driven BH ? 0.0006 1.80* 0.0006 1.92*
No. of politically 
driven BH ? -0.0009 -0.52 -0.0009 -0.51
No. of socially 
driven BH -0.0009 -0.93 -0.0019 -2.23**
No. of 
multilateral BH + 0.0021 2.37** 0.0021 2.35**
In(size) - -0.0015 -6.04** * -0.0014 -5 77*** -0.0017 -6.81*** -0.0017 -6.90** * -0.0017 -7 08***
ROA - -0.0062 -1.31 -0.0080 -1.70* -0.0088 -1.77* -0.0088 -1.78* -0.0072 -1.45
Growth - 0.0000 -0.05 0.0000 -0.12 0.0000 -0.24 0.0000 -0.20 0.0000 -0.10
Leverage + -0.0101 -2 94*** -0.0095 -2.85*** -0.0086 -2.67*** -0.0087 -2 74*** -0.0093 -2 87***
Average shares 
held by BH -0.0001 -1.20 -0.0001 -1.62 -0.0002 -2.03** -0.0002 -1.79* -0.0002 -1.80*
Big four dummy - -0.0065 -1.32 -0.0068 -1.37 -0.0066 -1.32 -0.0069 -1.39 -0.0062 -1.24
R-square 0.0570 0.0496 0.0472 0.0496 0.0533
Taking our univariate and multivariate results together, accrual quality is lower for firms with market- 
driven and multilateral blockholders. Camara (2005) explains that market forces reward actions with 
money. He asserts that market-driven investors are motivated principally by financial gain. Thus, we 
might expect them to put greater pressure on the managers to increase earnings, which would in turn 
increase the likelihood of earnings management. In the case of multilateral investors, Camara (2005) 
explains that these investors have a variety of financial relationships with the firm. He asserts that if the 
payoffs associated with these relationships are different from those associated with equity ownership, 
these investors will sometimes not want to maximize shareholder value.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
To test the robustness of our results, we calculate accrual quality using the DD and MDD models as 
well.
Table 4 presents mean and median earnings quality calculated using the DD model for different 
incentive groups. Table 5 presents mean and median earnings quality calculated using the MDD model 
for different incentive groups. In both tables, Panel A compares mean and median values for firms with 
market-driven blockholders and firms with no market-driven blockholders. Panel B compares mean and 
median values for firms with politically driven blockholders and firms with no politically driven 
blockholders. Panel C compares mean and median values for firms with socially driven blockholders and 
firms with no socially driven blockholders. Panel D compares mean and median values for firms with 
multilateral blockholders and firms with no multilateral blockholders.
The results in Table 4, show that accrual quality continues to be worse for market-driven 
blockholders and multilateral blockholders. However, the results for the market-driven blockholders are 
not significant. Looking at Table 5, the results are consistent with Table 2. Firms with market-driven 
blockholders and multilateral blockholders seem to have worse accrual quality.
TABLE 4
EARNINGS QUALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF BLOCKHOLDERS (DD MODEL)
This table presents earnings quality calculated using the DD Model for different incentive groups. We 
perform a t-test for the difference in means and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in medians. 
Panel A compares mean and median values for firms with market-driven blockholders and firms with no 
market-driven blockholders. Panel B compares mean and median values for firms with politically driven 
blockholders and firms with no politically driven blockholders. Panel C compares mean and median 
values for firms with socially driven blockholders and firms with no socially driven blockholders. Panel 
D compares mean and median values for firms with multilateral blockholders and firms with no 
multilateral blockholders. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Incentive Classification Mean t Median z
Panel A. Market-driven blockholders
No market-driven BH 0.0061 -1.38 0.0019 -1.51
Market-driven BH 0.0100 0.0029
Difference -0.0039 -0.0010
Panel B. Politically driven blockholders
No politically driven BH 0.0099 0.69 0.0028 0.83
Politically driven BH 0.0058 0.0048
Difference 0.0041 -0.0020
Panel C. Socially driven blockholders
No socially driven BH 0.0102 1.30 0.0027 1.04
Socially driven BH 0.0081 0.0035
Difference 0.0021 -0.0008
Panel D. Multilateral blockholders
No multilateral BH 0.0091 -2.06** 0.0028 1.16
Multilateral BH 0.0118 0.0032
Difference -0.0027 -0.0004
TABLE 5
EARNINGS QUALITY AND THE EXISTENCE OF BLOCKHOLDERS (MDD MODEL)
This table presents earnings quality calculated using the MDD Model for different incentive groups. We 
perform a t-test for the difference in means and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference in medians. 
Panel A compares mean and median values for firms with market-driven blockholders and firms with no 
market-driven blockholders. Panel B compares mean and median values for firms with politically driven 
blockholders and firms with no politically driven blockholders. Panel C compares mean and median 
values for firms with socially driven blockholders and firms with no socially driven blockholders. Panel 
D compares mean and median values for firms with multilateral blockholders and firms with no 
multilateral blockholders. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Incentive Classification Mean t Median z
Panel A. Market-driven blockholders
No market-driven BH 0.0056 -1.46 0.0016 -1.79*
Market-driven BH 0.0094 0.0029
Difference -0.0038 -0.0013
Panel B. Politically driven blockholders
No politically driven BH 0.0093 0.64 0.0029 0.76
Politically driven BH 0.0058 0.0047
Difference 0.0035 -0.0018
Panel C. Socially driven blockholders
No socially driven BH 0.0095 1.15 0.0027 0.97
Socially driven BH 0.0079 0.0037
Difference 0.0016 -0.0010
Panel D. Multilateral blockholders
No multilateral BH 0.0085 -2.31** 0.0029 1.14
Multilateral BH 0.0112 0.0030
Difference -0.0027 -0.0001
Tables 6 and 7 present the results for the repeated regression analyses using the reverse measures of 
accrual quality calculated using the DD and MDD models, respectively. Models 1 to 5 are different 
specifications of the baseline regression model. Model 1 includes all variables in the baseline model. 
Model 2 specifically tests the impact of market-driven blockholders on the dependent variable. Model 3 
specifically tests the impact of politically driven blockholders on the dependent variable. Model 4 
specifically tests the impact of socially driven blockholders on the dependent variable. Model 5 
specifically tests the impact of multilateral blockholders on the dependent variable.
TABLE 6 
ROBUSTNESS REGRESSION ANALYSES (DD MODEL)
This table presents the results of the regression analyses. The dependent variable is the reverse measure of accrual quality calculated using the DD 
model following Ferreira and Laux (2016). We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. We also use robust standard errors 
corrected for clustering at industry level to allow for heteroskedasticity and industry-fixed effects. Models 1-5 are different specifications of the 
baseline regression model. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Mod el 1 Model 2 Model 3 Mot el 4 Model 5
Parameter Exp. Sign Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t
Intercept 0.0377 5.71*** 0.0388 5.95*** 0.0418 6.58*** 0.0419 6.63*** 0.0413 6.46***
Majority inside + 0.0032 0.97 0.0025 0.79 0.0019 0.59 0.0027 0.85 0.0025 0.74
No. of local BH - -0.0002 -0.26 -0.0002 -0.23 -0.0003 -0.33 0.0002 0.24 -0.0004 -0.46
No. of long-term
BH -0.0015 -2.45** -0.0014 -2.39** -0.0012 -2.09** -0.0010 -1.74* -0.0013 -2.43**
No. of market- 
driven BH ? 0.0007 1.57 0.0006 1.46
No. of politically 
driven BH ? -0.0015 -0.74 -0.0014 -0.75
No. of socially 
driven BH -0.0002 -0.18 -0.0014 -1.33
No. of 
multilateral BH + 0.0027 2.46** 0.0026 2.39**
In(size) - -0.0023 -6.59*** -0.0022 -6.44*** -0.0024 -7.36*** -0.0024 -0.0025 -7 59***
ROA - -0.0047 -0.70 -0.0070 -1.09 -0.0078 -1.18 -0.0078 -1.19 -0.0058 -0.87
Growth - 0.0000 -0.49 0.0000 -0.62 0.0000 -0.75 0.0000 -0.71 0.0000 -0.54
Leverage + -0.0085 -2.14** -0.0077 -1 99** -0.0068 -1.82* -0.0070 -1.88* -0.0077 -2.05**
Average shares 
held by BH -0.0002 -1.50 -0.0002 -1.87* -0.0002 -2.16** -0.0002 -2.04** -0.0002 -1.92*
Big four dummy - -0.0063 -1.12 -0.0068 -1.21 -0.0065 -1.17 -0.0067 -1.21 -0.0061 -1.07
R-square 0.0565 0.0498 0.0484 0.0492 0.0543
TABLE 7
ROBUSTNESS REGRESSION ANALYSES (MDD MODEL)
This table presents the results of the regression analyses. The dependent variable is the reverse measure of accrual quality calculated using the 
MDD model following Ferreira and Laux (2016). We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. We also use robust standard errors 
corrected for clustering at industry level to allow for heteroskedasticity and industry-fixed effects. Models 1-5 are different specifications of the 
baseline regression model. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Mod el 1 Model 2 Model 3 Mod el 4 Mod el 5
Parameter
Exp. 
Sign Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t
Intercept 0.0313 5.40*** 0.0325 5.68*** 0.0359 6.44*** 0.0360 6.50*** 0.0353 6.31***
Majority inside + 0.0029 0.93 0.0023 0.76 0.0016 0.53 0.0024 0.80 0.0022 0.69
No. of local BH - -0.0005 -0.51 -0.0004 -0.46 -0.0005 -0.57 0.0000 0.03 -0.0006 -0.71
No. of long-term
BH -0.0008 -1.46 -0.0007 -1.26 -0.0004 -0.83 -0.0003 -0.51 -0.0006 -1.16
No. of market- 
driven BH ? 0.0007 1.99** 0.0006 1.83*
No. of politically 
driven BH ? -0.0013 -0.68 -0.0013 -0.72
No. of socially 
driven BH - -0.0001 -0.09 -0.0014 -1.39
No. of 
multilateral BH + 0.0028 2.63*** 0.0026 2.53**
In(size) - -0.0019 -6.01*** -0.0018 -5.86*** -0.0021 -6.88*** -0.0021 -6.93*** -0.0022
ROA - -0.0037 -0.68 -0.0061 -1.15 -0.0069 -1.28 -0.0070 -1.29 -0.0049 -0.90
Growth - 0.0000 -0.14 0.0000 -0.26 0.0000 -0.42 0.0000 -0.36 0.0000 -0.21
Leverage + -0.0093 -2.58** -0.0084 -2.40** -0.0074 -2.18** -0.0076 -2.25** -0.0083 -2.44**
Average shares 
held by BHs -0.0001 -1.27 -0.0002 -1.66* -0.0002 -2.01** -0.0002 -1.89* -0.0002 -1.76*
Big four dummy - -0.0045 -0.86 -0.0050 -0.96 -0.0047 -0.91 -0.0049 -0.95 -0.0042 -0.81
R-square 0.0535 0.0453 0.0432 0.0442 0.0504
In Table 6, multilateral blockholders continue to negatively impact accrual quality. In Table 7, both 
market-driven and multilateral blockholders continue to negatively impact accrual quality, which is 
consistent with our main regression analysis.
CONCLUSION
Blockholders are seen as effective monitoring mechanisms, and their existence mitigates the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders. In the literature, blockholders have been associated with a 
lower likelihood of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996; Chung et al., 2002; Cheng & Reitenga, 
2009). However, most of the studies assume that blockholders are a homogeneous group. Instead, 
blockholders are a heterogeneous group that varies in its beliefs, skills, and preferences (Cronqvist & 
Fahlenbrach, 2009). To date, few studies acknowledge their heterogeneity, and a significant part of 
blockholder heterogeneity still remains unexplained (Dou et al., 2016).
This study is an attempt to understand the unexplained proportion of blockholder heterogeneity and to 
analyze blockholders’ impact on earnings quality.
We find that accrual quality is lower for firms with market-driven and multilateral blockholders. As 
Camara (2005) explained, market forces reward actions with money. The principal motivation for market- 
driven investors is financial gain. Thus, we might expect market-driven blockholders to put greater 
pressure on managers to increase earnings. This would in turn decrease earnings quality. On the other 
hand, multilateral investors have a variety of financial relationships with the firm. When the payoffs 
associated with these relationships differ from those associated with equity ownership, these investors 
might deviate from maximizing shareholder value (Camara, 2005), hence lowering the earnings quality.
ENDNOTES
1. Source: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17435.htm
2. Source: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt
3. We follow the methodology described in detail in Ferreira and Laux (2016) to calculate accrual quality using 
the DD model. Our MDD and FDD calculations follow the same approach. Namely, to calculate the standard 
deviation of a given firm-year observation’s residuals, we go back five years and take the standard deviation of 
the five most recent residuals prior to the observation year.
4. Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1014242118618929560
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